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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for review in this appeal is 
whether the court below erred in holding that out-of-state 
defendants who had no contact with Utah except to cause 
intentional injury to a Utah resident are not subject to 
personal jurisdiction in this state. The trial court's ruling 
on this issue represents a conclusion of law subjected to 
de novo review on appeal. Anderson v. American Soc. of Plastic 
Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This appeal is controlled by the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-27-22 and 24 (Rep. Vol. 9 1992) and the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which provisions are set forth in their entirety 
in the addendum to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third District 
Court dismissing plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a Utah resident who alleged that the 
defendants, all California residents, made false allegations to 
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California law enforcement authorities with the intent to cause 
injury to plaintiff at a time when defendants knew plaintiff 
was living in Utah. The complaint further alleged that as a 
result of defendants' false statements, plaintiff was 
wrongfully arrested in Utah and incurred economic and emotional 
damages, including injury to her reputation. 
All of the defendants' conduct complained of by 
plaintiff occurred in California, and defendants are not 
subject in general jurisdiction in the Courts of Utah. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah's long-arm statute provides that an individual 
submits himself to jurisdiction in Utah's courts by causing an 
injury within this state. The Act further provides that it is 
to be interpreted and applied so as to permit exercise of 
jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted 
by the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme 
Court has previously recognized that a defendant who 
intentionally causes injury in a foreign state has no 
legitimate constitutional objection to the exercise of 
jurisdiction over him by that foreign state even if all his 
wrongful conduct occurred outside of that state. Accordingly, 
defendants' objection to the exercise of jurisdiction in this 
action should have been rejected, and the court below erred in 
granting the motion to dismiss. 
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ARGUMENT 
ONE WHO INTENTIONALLY CAUSES INJURY TO A 
RESIDENT OF UTAH IS SUBJECT TO JURISDICTION 
IN UTAH COURTS FOR REDRESS OF THAT INJURY. 
In the present action, plaintiff's complaint alleged 
that the defendants made intentionally false accusations to 
California law enforcement authorities of criminal conduct on 
her part, knowing she was residing in Utah, for the purpose of 
subjecting her to arrest in Utah and prosecution in 
California. After the California criminal charges were 
dismissed, plaintiff brought this action for malicious 
prosecution and defamation. The court below dismissed for lack 
of personal jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1992) 
provides that nonresidents submit themselves to the 
jurisdiction of Utah's courts by "the causing of any injury 
within this state . . .". The legislature has provided that 
Utah's long-arm statute "should be applied so as to assert 
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the fullest extent 
permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 
(Rep. Vol. 9 1992). Our Supreme Court has emphasized that in 
accordance with the legislature's policy declaration, "the 
protection afforded by Utah courts must be extended to the 
fullest extent allowed by due process of law." Synergistics v. 
Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106, (Utah 1985). 
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In this case, the defendants intentionally fabricated 
a false accusation of criminal conduct on the part of the 
plaintiff, intending that she be prosecuted in California. At 
the time they did so, they knew she was a Utah resident and 
that their false allegations would, of necessity, cause her 
damage here and involve Utah authorities in the process of 
having her arrested and returned to California to face the 
charges. This conduct is more than sufficient to establish the 
defendants' minimum contacts with Utah necessary to support 
personal jurisdiction. 
The United States Supreme Court has held, 
unequivocally, that a non-resident of the forum state who 
intentionally acts to cause injury in the forum state to a 
resident of that state has acted in a manner which warrants the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the forum. In Calder v. Jones, 465 
U.S. 783 (1984), the court held that defendants who resided in 
and acted in Florida, but whose conduct was intended to injure 
the plaintiff in California, were subject to jurisdiction in 
California. While defendants in this action suggested below 
that the Court relied on other matters in reaching its decision 
in Calder, the Court itself made its holding very clear. 
We hold that jurisdiction over petitioners 
in California is proper because of their 
intentional conduct in Florida calculated to 
cause injury to respondent in California. 
465 U.S. at 791. 
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The court rejected the notion that a defendant could 
avoid jurisdiction of the courts of the very state where he had 
intended to inflict a tortious injury. 
An individual injured in California need not 
go to Florida to seek redress from persons 
who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly 
cause the injury in California. 
465 U.S. at 790. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in interpreting 
Colorado's long-arm provision, relied upon Calder in holding 
that a defendant who has no contacts with the forum state 
except the commission of an intentional tort which causes 
injury in that state, has no due process objection to the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the forum. In Burt v. Board of 
Regents of University of Nebraska, 757 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 
1985), the plaintiff alleged that he was libeled when the 
Chairman of the Department of Orthopedic Surgery at the 
University of Nebraska, a Dr. Connolly, wrote an unfavorable 
letter to a Colorado hospital in response to its inquiry about 
Dr. Burt, the plaintiff. Dr. Connolly filed a motion to 
dismiss with an affidavit asserting that he essentially had no 
contacts with Colorado whatsoever. In reversing the District 
Court, the Court of Appeals held that the intentional injury 
inflicted in Colorado was sufficient for the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction. 
Taking Dr. Burt's allegations as true, which 
we must do on a motion to dismiss, we hold 
no due process notions of fairness are 
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violated by requiring one who intentionally 
libels another to answer for the truth of 
his statements in any state where the libel 
causes harm to the victim. 
757 F.2d at 245. 
Utah's long-arm statute has been held to permit 
exercise of personal jurisdiction for intentional torts when 
injury is caused in Utah. In Berret v. Life Ins. Co. of the 
Southwest, 623 F.Supp. 946 (D. Utah 1985), Judge Greene noted 
that Utah's statute applied to injuries which occur in the 
state, without regard to where the tortious act occurs, and 
that due process provides no bar to the exercise of 
jurisdiction when the defendant intended injury to a forum 
resident. Judge Greene noted that the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly acknowledged that a minimum contacts analysis 
"properly focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the 
forum and the litigation." 623 F.Supp. at 951 (quoting Keeton 
v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 [1984]). In referring to 
this analysis as undertaken by the Supreme Court, Judge Greene 
stated that: 
In Keeton, the Court further indicated that 
the "fairness" of requiring a defendant who 
is not a resident of the forum state to 
appear in the forum depends in part on the 
expressed public policy interest of the 
forum state, noting the particular interest 
of a forum state in connection with tort 
claims; 
A state has an especial interest 
in exercising judicial jurisdiction 
over those who commit torts within its 
territory. This is because torts 
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involve wrongful conduct which a state 
seeks to deter, and against which it 
attempts to afford protection, by 
providing that a tortfeasor shall be 
liable for damages which are the 
proximate result of his tort. 
In this case, a strong public policy of 
the state of Utah is embodied in its long-
arm statute for redress of tortious acts 
which cause injury in this state. 
623 F.Supp. at 951 (citations omitted). 
The forum's interest in having its tort laws given 
effect, coupled with the defendants' acts of intentionally 
causing injury to a forum resident, are sufficient to permit 
exercise of jurisdiction in litigation arising directly from 
the injurious acts. In Frontier Federal Savings & Loan v. 
Nat'l Hotel Corp., 675 F.Supp. 1293 (D. Utah 1987), Judge 
Greene reiterated that in an intentional tort case arising from 
an injury suffered in the forum state, the defendant must 
reasonably antitipate being called to respond in the forum, and 
due process considerations are satisfied when the forum 
exercises jurisdiction. This reasoning has been repeatedly 
adopted by both state and federal courts across the nation. As 
stated in Coblentz GMC/Freightliner v. General Motors Corp., 
724 F.Supp. 1364 (M.D. Ala. 1989), 
when the origin of a deliberate, 
nonfortuitous tort is in one state (or, as 
in the case at hand, a foreign country) and 
the intended injury to a recognized victim 
is in another state, the tortfeasor has 
affirmatively established minimum contacts 
with the state in which the injury occurred, 
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if the tortfeasor knew at the time it 
committed the alleged tort that the victim 
would be injured in that state. 
724 F.Supp. at 1369. See also, Brainerd v. Governors of 
University of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1989); Duke v. 
Young, 496 So.2d 37 (Ala. 1986). 
Abuse of the judicial system of one state, such as 
that engaged in by the defendants in this case, can subject a 
party to jurisdiction in a different state if the party intends 
his actions to have consequences in the other state. For 
example, in Lake v Lake, 817 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1987), an 
attorney who improperly obtained an ex-parte child custody 
order in California, knowing and intending that it would be 
used by authorities in Idaho to remove a child from his 
father's custody, was held to have subjected himself to 
personal jurisdiction in Idaho. The Court held that 
Idaho could properly exercise jurisdiction 
over the defendant "whose only 'contact' 
with the forum state is the 'purposeful 
direction of a foreign act having effect in 
the forum state." 
817 F.2d at 1423 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). 
Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Calder, 
supra, it had been held that a resident of one state who 
improperly initiates legal proceedings which ultimately result 
in damage to a resident of a different state has no due process 
objection to having to defend his actions in the state where 
the injured party resides. In Simon v. United States, 644 F.2d 
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490 (5th Cir. 1981), the Court held that a Georgia lawyer who 
improperly caused courts in both Georgia and Louisiana to issue 
process against a Louisiana resident which ultimately led to 
the arrest and detention of the Louisiana resident was subject 
to personal jurisdiction in Louisiana. The "defendant-directed 
conduct" occurring in Louisiana which he was responsible for 
initiating in Georgia was held to be a sufficient contact with 
the forum to overcome any due process concerns. 
While the defendants have previously characterized 
Ms. Bryant's presence in Utah as a "fortuitous" circumstance, 
the simple fact is that when they made their false and 
malicious charges against her, they knew she was a Utah 
resident and knew that if they were successful in causing her 
injury, that injury would be suffered in Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The activity in which defendants engaged which 
subjects them to personal jurisdiction in Utah is very simply 
stated—they chose to intentionally injure a Utah resident. It 
has been universally recognized that such intentional conduct 
towards a known and intended victim is a sufficient contact 
with the victim's state of residence to make it a proper forum 
for the redress of the victim's injury, and due process is 
fully satisfied by making the tortfeasor defend his actions in 
the location where they caused the very injury intended. 
-9-
Accordingly, the judgment below should be reversed and the case 
remanded for disposition on the merits. 
DATED this /7/i day of February, 1993. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By fr. MJ^J& 
M. David Eckers! 
Attorneys for Appelant 
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A D D E N D D M 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-27-22: 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative 
determination, that the public interest demands the state 
provide its citizens with an effective means of redress against 
nonresident persons, who, through certain significant minimal 
contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens 
entitled to the state's protection. This legislative action is 
deemed necessary because of technological progress which has 
substantially increased the flow of commence betwen the several 
states resulting in increased interaction between persons of 
this state and persons of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum 
protection to citizens of this state, should be applied so as 
to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the 
fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24: 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102, whether 
or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, 
submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representa-
tive to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any 
claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to suppy services or goods in this 
state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real 
estate situated in this state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or 
risk located within this state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate 
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the marital 
relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent 
departure from the state; or the commission in this state of 
the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a 
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the 
defendant had no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this 
state which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, 
Chapter 45a, to determine paternity for the purpose of 
establishing responsibility for child support. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
SECTION 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
